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ANTITRUST SCRUTINY FOR THE OCCUPATIONS:  
NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S. 
LICENSING BOARDS
Rebecca Haw Allensworth
Vanderbilt University, U. S.
Introduction
The American system of occupational licensing is under attack. The current regime 
– which allows for almost total self-regulation – has weathered sustained criticism 
from consumer advocate groups, academics, politicians, and even the White House 
itself. But the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners v. FTC,1 portends a sea change in how almost a third of American 
workers are regulated. The case has made it possible for aggrieved individuals and 
government enforcers to bring suits against most state licensing boards, challenging 
their restrictions as violating federal competition law. The case has prompted two 
responses: a flood of antitrust suits against boards, and a panic among states as they 
scramble to protect licensing boards from antitrust liability. This article describes 
the current system of professional regulation in the U.S., explains the North Carolina 
Dental opinion and its legal impact, and discusses states’ likely responses. The 
upshot is that in order to protect occupational licensing from antitrust suit, states will 
have to reform their regulatory systems in ways that will improve the fairness and 
efficiency of American occupational licensing laws.  
1. Occupational Licensing in the United States
Occupational licensing is ubiquitous in the United States: nearly thirty percent of 
American workers must have a government-issued professional license to legally 
*   Professor of Law.
1   135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
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perform their jobs.2 The legal institutions that form this complex web of regulation, 
however, are relatively obscure. For the most part, states, not the federal government, 
regulate occupational licensing. They do so through boards that create and implement 
entry requirements, rules of ethics, and standards for discipline. Each state has a 
separate board for most occupations, with some states having up to forty-nine 
separate boards. This decentralized system of professional regulation has resulted in 
a proliferation of state licensing boards – currently there are 1,740 operational boards 
nationwide – permitting each individual board to operate in relative obscurity.3 In 
the aggregate, these nearly invisible institutions deliver a hefty bill to consumers 
– economists estimate the annual cost of licensing restrictions at around $116 
billion4 – while providing perhaps little in the way of public health and safety.
 
1.1. Professionally-Dominated Boards
My investigation into the state statutes creating the 1,740 American licensing boards 
revealed that the vast majority—85%—are required by statute to be staffed by a 
majority of license-holders in the profession the board regulates.5 In other words, 
most American occupational licensing regimes amount to self-regulation: doctors 
regulate doctors, and barbers regulate barbers. For example, Ohio’s state medical 
board, which is typical, is comprised of twelve members: seven physicians, one 
osteopathic physician, one podiatrist, and three “public” (non-licensee) members.6 
This composition gives license-holders the ability to vote as a bloc to set the terms of 
competition even when other board members disagree. This overwhelming degree of 
professional control would be bad enough, but the empirical data likely understates 
the problem. Anecdotal investigation into actual board practices reveals that member 
absences, position vacancies, and even violations of statutory requirements often 
lead to professionally dominated decision-making even where dominance is not 
required by statute.7
Self-regulation carries with it the familiar risk of self-dealing. Licensing regulations 
inherently exclude some would-be professionals from the market and set the terms of 
competition among professional providers. These kinds of restrictions are justified 
on theoretical grounds as protecting consumer safety, but of course they also can 
2   See Morris M. Kleiner – Alan B. Krueger: Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational 
Licensing on the Labor Market. J. Lab. Econ., Vol. 31. (2013) 173., 198. (estimating that, as of 2008, 
29% of U.S. workers were licensed and noting that licensing is a growing phenomenon in the U.S. 
economy).
3    Rebecca Haw Allensworth: Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close. Cal. 
L. Rev., (forthcoming 2017) manuscript at 3.
4   See Morris M. Kleiner: Occupational Licensing., 14 J. Econ. Persp., Vol. 14. 189, 115 (2000) 189., 
115. (estimating the cost of occupational licensing to consumers at $116–$139 billion a year).
5   Allensworth (forthcoming 2017) op. cit. manuscript at 4.
6   Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 4731.01 (West 2016).
7   See Allensworth (forthcoming 2017) op. cit. manuscript at 4.
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lead to a less competitive professional environment, which manifests itself in higher 
prices and lower service availability. Self-regulation means entrusting the delicate 
balance between competition and regulation to the license-holders themselves – 
those who have the most to gain from inefficiently restrictive rules.8 The dominance 
of professionals on licensing boards means that the fox is asked to guard the hen 
house. These results should surprise those under the impression that occupational 
licensing in the U.S. is governmental, which is to say that it is in any measure public 
or public-regarding. In reality, licensing schemes are run by entities that look more 
like cartels than governmental agencies.
1.2. Anticompetitive Regulations
The result of self-regulation has been disappointingly predictable. Many licensing 
requirements seem aimed more at relaxing competition among professionals than at 
improving public health and safety. 
Licensing restrictions can be theoretically justified as addressing market failures 
that would occur in an unregulated market for professional services. These failures 
typically involve asymmetrical information about service quality or market 
externalities in a transaction between a provider and a consumer. The first kind of 
market failure occurs when the service provider is unable to credibly communicate the 
quality of his services, and consumers are therefore unwilling to pay a premium for 
excellent service. Services providers in these circumstances will have little incentive 
to provide excellent service, since they cannot command a premium for their special 
efforts, and will therefore provide only the minimum quality the market can bear. This 
market – famously dubbed the “Market for Lemons” by economist George Akerlof 
– is inefficient if there are professionals willing to provide, and consumers willing to 
pay for, high quality service.9 Licensing regulations can prevent this inefficiency by 
establishing a “floor” of service quality through strict entry requirements (such as 
education or examination) and professional standards of practice.
The second kind of market failure occurs as a result of market externalities, 
which are costs that are visited on society at large, not just the transacting parties. 
Without externalities, the costs and benefits of an exchange are borne by the parties 
to that transaction. For example, if I buy a bad cup of coffee, I suffer the harm, and 
will likely visit a consequence on the seller in the future by not returning with my 
business. But in some markets, the consequences of poor quality transactions are 
not fully internalized by the provider and the patient. For instance, the cost of poor 
quality medical care may be visited not only on the patient but also on the patient’s 
employer, family, and local emergency room. Where transactions create negative 
externalities, low-quality, low-price transactions may be inefficient. Licensing can 
8   See Aaron Edlin – Rebecca Haw: Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face 
Antitrust Scrutiny? U. Pa. L. Rev., Vol. 162. (2014) 1093., 1156.
9    See George A. Akerlof: The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
Q. J. Econ., Vol. 84. (1970) 488., 489.
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prevent these inefficiencies by creating a minimum service quality through licensing 
requirements and rules. 
From an efficiency perspective, restricting competition by limiting entry and 
dictating the terms of practice can only be justified in the presence of these market 
failures. Further, a licensing restriction can only be justified to the extent that its 
benefits (in terms of addressing a market failure) outweigh its costs (the higher 
prices charged to consumers). In other words, licensing is efficient only if it actually 
improves quality, and only if it does so without too high a price tag for consumers. 
With competitors controlling their own competitive environment, it is unsurprising 
that many American professional licensing regulations cannot be justified as efficient. 
The licensing of many professions in America cannot even pass the laugh test. 
Occupations currently licensed in at least one state include locksmiths, beekeepers, 
auctioneers, interior designers, fortune tellers, tour guides, and shampooers. And 
the excesses of licensing go beyond these examples of regulatory overreach. Some 
commonly licensed professions, such as barbering and cosmetology, lack a plausible 
market failure justification. It is hard to say that consumers are unable to assess the 
quality of these services, or that low quality service creates widespread harm. Further, 
licensing restrictions that do address a plausible market failure often do so with too 
heavy a hand. For example, the requirement that nurse practitioners be supervised by 
doctors, a requirement in many states,10 theoretically addresses externalities in the 
market for healthcare. But in light of empirical evidence that supervised nursing is 
more expensive to consumers, yet provides no added quality or safety benefits,11 it 
seems clear that the supervision requirement goes too far. 
Anecdotal evidence of licensing run amok is easy to find, but so is empirical 
evidence that licensing often goes too far in benefiting professionals at the expense 
of consumers. Licensing has an obvious effect on consumer prices, as a theoretical 
matter and as a matter of fact. Labor economists estimate that when a profession goes 
from unlicensed to licensed status, wages rise at least 10%.12 Of course, if that wage 
premium bought higher quality services, it may be efficient. But while licensing has 
a significant effect on consumer prices and professional wages, its effect on service 
quality is dubious. Economic studies of service quality paint a murky picture.13 Most 
of the empirical studies measuring the impact of licensing on quality evidence is 
10  See Sharon Christian – Catherine Dower: Scope of Practice Laws in Health Care: Rethinking 
the Role of Nurse Practitioners. Cal. HealthCare Found., (January 2008) 3, available at http://www.
chcf.org/publications/2008/01/scope-of-practice-laws-in-health-care-rethinking-the-role-of-nurse-
practitioners (noting that thirty states require at least some degree of physician supervision or 
collaboration).
11  See id. at 6 (listing multiple studies finding no material difference in quality of care).
12  See Morris M. Kleiner: Regulating Occupations: Quality or Monopoly? Emp’t Res., Vol. 13., N. 1. 
(2006), available at http://research.upjohn.org/empl_research/vol13/iss1/1.
13  See Morris M. Kleiner: Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? 53 
tbl.3.2 (2006) (showing varying levels of quality improvements in a number of licensed professions).
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equivocal,14 and one study even claims to show that licensing reduces quality.15 By 
any measure, the American system of professional self-regulation does not achieve 
an efficient balance of regulation and competition. 
2. Antitrust Liability and North Carolina Dental
Practitioner-dominated licensing boards came under attack in a recent U.S. Supreme 
Court case decided in May 2015. The case, North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC, completed a revolution in the American federal-state balance of 
power that previous cases in this area had foreshadowed. In the process, it placed a 
wide swath of American occupational regulation – perhaps the vast majority of it – in 
the crosshairs of antitrust law. States should interpret this case as an existential threat 
to how they regulate the professions. It will no doubt precipitate regulatory reforms. 
2.1. State Action Immunity and the Antitrust Laws
 
To understand North Carolina Dental and its impact, a few words should be said about 
a relatively obscure area of American law known as antitrust state action immunity 
(or sometimes Parker immunity, for the case that established it). The Sherman Act,16 
the major federal antitrust statute outlawing unreasonable restraints of trade and 
monopolistic conduct, does not limit its reach to private actors. Nothing in the text 
of the statute prevents someone from challenging a state law restricting competition 
as “unreasonable” under the Act. Most regulation, state or otherwise, creates 
competitive winners and losers. Yet the wholesale application of federal competition 
law to state action would threaten to invalidate all or most state regulatory activity, 
a result that would offend principles of federalism. Thus, in 1943, the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized “state action immunity” from federal antitrust law. In Parker v. 
Brown,17 the Court held that conduct by the state would be untouchable by federal 
antitrust suits. The opinion, however, included an important caveat: a state could 
not merely authorize private actors to violate the Sherman Act. Allowing states to 
selectively repeal the Sherman Act in this way would undermine the national policy 
in favor of competition.18
14  See, e.g, Sidney L. Carroll – Robert J. Gaston: Occupational Licensing and the Quality of Service. 
Law & Hum. Behav., Vol. 7. (1983) 139., 145. (concluding that licensing results in better delivered 
quality but not better quality received by society as a whole). See Joshua D. Angrist – Jonathan 
Guryan: Teacher Testing, Teacher Education, and Teacher Characteristics. Am. Econ. Rev., Vol. 
94. (2004) 241., 246. (finding “no evidence that testing hurdles have raised the quality of new and 
inexperienced teachers”). 
15  See Carroll–Gaston op. cit. 145 (suggesting that “excessive restriction” reduces the quality of 
services available to the “lower middle income classes”). 
16  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2016).
17  317 U.S. 341 (1943).
18  Ibid. at 351 (explaining that “a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful”).
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That caveat in Parker has become the source of decades of controversy as the 
Court has struggled to define the contours of state action immunity. What is the 
precise line between “state action” and action merely authorized by the state? How 
close of a relationship must the regulating entity have to the sovereign branches of a 
state before it can invoke immunity? These questions have proved especially vexing 
as states have increasingly used entities other than its sovereign branches – such as 
municipalities, bar associations, and occupational licensing boards – to create and 
enforce regulation. In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc.,19 the Court created a two-part test for whether an entity could claim immunity 
for its activity. The Midcal test confers antitrust immunity on entities that both act 
according to a state’s “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” policy to 
displace competition, and are “actively supervised” by the state itself.20
Shortly after Midcal, the Court further complicated the question by creating 
a shortcut to Parker immunity for some kinds of regulatory entities. In Town 
of Hallie v. Eau Claire,21 the Court held that cities enjoy immunity for their 
anticompetitive regulation as long as they meet Midcal’s first prong. In other words, 
even unsupervised municipal regulation is immune so long as it comports with the 
state’s “clearly articulated” intent to displace competition.22 The court justified the 
shortcut by appealing to a city’s public nature, explaining that “[w]here the actor is 
a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing 
arrangement.”23 
Who, besides municipalities, can take the Hallie shortcut? The question turns out 
to be crucial to the status of licensing boards, because the “clear articulation” prong 
has proved to be easily met in the professional licensing context.24 At the time the 
Court was set to hear North Carolina Dental, the question of whether an occupational 
licensing board was entitled to take the Hallie shortcut was very much in dispute. On 
the one hand, the Hallie opinion itself had suggested (without deciding) that state 
agencies would be entitled to the shortcut.25 And because many states refer to their 
boards as “agencies,” this gave boards a good claim to using the shortcut. On the other 
hand, scholars, some lower courts, and the Federal Trade Commission argued that 
what made municipalities special for immunity purposes was not their nominal claim 
to being governmental, but their public accountability. By this measure, occupational 
19  445 U.S. 97 (1980).
20  Ibid. at 943.
21  471 U.S. 34 (1985).
22  Ibid. at 46 (“We now conclude that the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in 
cases in which the actor is a municipality.”).
23  Ibid. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
24  See, e.g., Benson v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 673 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that 
a statute which established the board of dentistry and gave it power to regulate professional practice 
and entry requirements satisfied the clear articulation prong).
25  Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 (“In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active state 
supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that issue.”).
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licensing boards – which are controlled by self-dealing licensees and which operate 
outside of the public eye – should be held to both Midcal prongs. 
  
2.2. North Carolina Dental
The latest chapter in the state action immunity saga specifically addressed the 
question of whether occupational regulation could be challenged under the Sherman 
Act. In 2006, the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners – a licensing 
board comprised of six dentists, one dental hygienist, and one public member – 
initiated a campaign to suppress competition from non-dentists in the market for 
cosmetic teeth whitening. The dentists were apparently vexed by the rise of a new, 
cheaper means of whitening teeth that was being performed in malls and at beauty 
salons, which reduced demand for the expensive teeth whitening services offered 
by licensed dentists. The Board “did battle” with the non-dentist teeth whiteners 
by issuing cease-and-desist letters characterizing teeth whitening as the practice of 
dentistry and threatening legal action if the non-dentists persisted.26 The campaign 
worked. Within a few months of the Board’s actions, the state’s dentists had regained 
their monopoly over teeth whitening. 
The Federal Trade Commission brought suit, charging that the letter campaign 
was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The FTC 
argued that the board was not entitled to state action immunity because unlike 
municipalities, it was required to meet Midcal’s “active supervision” prong – a test 
that it would fail. In the FTC’s view, the board was private because of the private 
interests that dominated its decision-making and private regulators were forbidden 
from taking the Hallie shortcut. To the FTC, it did not matter that the state of North 
Carolina believed the Board was a state entity, that state statutes referred to the board 
as a “state agency,” or that the state itself had filed an amicus brief arguing for the 
board’s immunity. 
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court sided with the FTC. The Court made clear that 
what made the municipality in Hallie unlikely to join a private price fixing cartel, and 
therefore merit the immunity shortcut, was not its claim to being governmental in a 
formal sense, but rather its lack of incentives to self-deal.27 However, for an entity 
controlled by competing professionals and tasked with regulating the terms of their 
competition, state supervision was required. Otherwise, “the national policy in favor 
of competition [would be] thwarted by casting […] a gauzy cloak of state involvement 
over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”28 The Court held that 
a state board on which “a controlling number of decisionmakers are active market 
26  N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1108 (quoting App. To Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 103a, N.C. Dental (No. 13-
534), 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27  N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1111.
28  Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 98 (1980).
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participants in the occupation the board regulates” must be actively supervised by the 
state or else face antitrust liability.29
North Carolina Dental left unanswered several questions that will spawn a new 
set of controversies, some of which are already working their way through the lower 
courts. The first open question – what constitutes “active supervision” – is as old as 
the case that created the supervision requirement in the first place. Although the Court 
has considered the issue in several cases, it has always been vague in its guidance. 
The second set of questions – who counts as “active market participants” and how 
many constitute a “controlling number” – are new to the state action immunity 
doctrine. Giving proper meaning of these new terms requires understanding what 
gives rise to the self-dealing risk in the first place. 
2.2.1. Active Supervision
 
The Court has never been particularly clear about what constitutes active supervision. 
Notably, it has never found a supervisory scheme to pass muster. North Carolina 
Dental emphasized that “the inquiry regarding active supervision is flexible and 
context-dependent,”30 making it difficult to predict how much state involvement is 
enough. The case recited two familiar requirements for supervision – first that it 
be more than a “negative option,” or an unexercised power to review the board’s 
actions,31 and second that it be substantive and not merely procedural.32 The case then 
added a new requirement, that the supervisor “have the power to veto or modify” the 
decision it reviews.33 
Based on the Court’s renewed emphasis on political accountability as a condition 
of antitrust immunity, it seems reasonable to predict that “active supervision” will 
entail a state review process that forces states to take transparent responsibility for 
the substantive content of the regulation. This almost certainly means that review 
must be non-deferential: a state must take a fresh look at the regulation and decide 
whether it comports with state policy without putting a thumb on the scale. And it 
may mean that state supervisors must identify, quantify, and approve the competitive 
consequences flowing from the regulation. Delegation of regulation to competitors 
creates both a theoretical and, as it turns out, a very real risk of self-dealing at the 
expense of consumers. If, as the Court has said, supervision seeks to “assign political 
responsibility, not obscure it,”34 then supervision should force states to own the 
29  N.C. Dental at 1114.
30  Ibid. at 1117 (“In general […] the adequacy of supervision otherwise will depend on all the 
circumstances of a case.”).
31  See ibid. at 1112 (explaining that the power to review must be actually exercised to be “active 
supervision”). See also Ticor, 504 U.S. at 622–23 (holding that the mere potential for review is 
inadequate).
32  See N.C. Dental at 1116; see also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
33  N.C. Dental at 1116.
34  Ticor at 636.
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economic impact of the regulations they tolerate. To this end, I have advocated for 
the use of competitive impact statements – identifying and at least attempting to 
quantify the economic and competitive consequences of a reviewed regulation – as a 
condition of finding that the state “actively supervised” the challenged regulation.35
Under the criteria set out in North Carolina Dental for active supervision, most 
states probably do not supervise their licensing boards. States typically allow boards 
to be sued for failing to comply with that state’s Administrative Procedure Act, but this 
review is likely to be considered insufficiently substantive to qualify as supervision.36 
Some states have “rules review” procedures whereby substate regulations, such as 
those created by a licensing board, are reviewed by a state commission or committee 
before having the force of law,37 but state legislatures typically cannot modify or 
veto the decision below. At the time North Carolina Dental was decided, no court or 
commentator had identified an example of state-level substantive review of all board 
activity, located in an executive agency not dominated by active market participants.
2.2.2. Competitor Control
 
As my survey of the statutory composition of the 1,740 licensing boards in the U.S. 
reveals, most boards are comprised of a majority of licensees. The North Carolina 
Dental opinion used a curious phrase to describe the dominance that triggers the 
supervision requirement. It held that a state board on which “a controlling number of 
decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the board regulates” 
must be actively supervised to enjoy immunity.38 This sentence raises two questions. 
First, who counts as an “active market participant in the occupation the board 
regulates”? Second, how many is a “controlling number” and why did the court not 
simply say “majority”? 
The courts will interpret “active market participant” to mean those most likely 
to self-deal, which in the licensing board context means members currently holding 
a license issued by the board itself. This interpretation comports with the antitrust 
state action principle that additional state involvement is necessary when the state 
relies on industry self-regulation, the most competitively risky form of governance. 
And it comports with substantive antitrust law. Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, naked 
agreements among competitors to restrict competition are per se illegal. This rule 
reflects the notion that competitors, when combining to decide the terms of their 
competition, inevitably benefit themselves at the expense of the consumer. The 
principal concern in an antitrust suit against a board is that board members who are 
35  See Rebecca Haw Allensworth: The New Antitrust Federalism. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102., 
Iss. 6. (2016).
36  See Edlin–Haw op. cit. 1123 n.179. Further, because this review only occurs when someone brings 
suit these are likely the “negative option” found lacking by the Court. See ibid. at 1123.
37  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Assembly, Legislative Regulation Review Committee, https://www.cga.ct.gov/
rr/; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1052 (2013).
38  N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
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currently in competition with one another will often that find that their interest in 
protecting consumers conflicts with their profit motives to keep competitors out and 
prices high.
The members of a licensing board with the strongest incentive to self-deal 
are those who hold a license issued by the board. When a board only issues one 
kind of license – for example, a dental license – the dynamics of self-dealing are 
simple. Board members who hold the same license are like horizontal competitors 
dealing in undifferentiated goods. A permissive licensing rule that either lets in 
more competitors or allows for more competition among incumbents threatens the 
bottom line of all license-holders. A more difficult question is raised by boards that 
issue multiple kinds of licenses and have representatives from each kind of license 
on the board. In this circumstance, there is an argument that because two board 
members must obtain separate licenses, they should not both be counted towards 
the dominance discussed in North Carolina Dental. But the reality of these boards 
– that the different licenses issued by the same board often have significant practical 
overlap, and that there is a risk of back-scratching among similar professions – 
suggests that all licensees holding some license issued by the board ought to count 
towards professional dominance.
Likewise, “controlling number” ought to be defined according to the reality of 
board practice and procedure. At the very least, it seems likely that “control” will 
mean that license-holders, voting as a bloc, can determine a board’s vote without 
assent from non-professional members. In the simplest case (where the full board votes 
and every member has an equal vote) “controlling number” will be synonymous with 
“majority.” But the voting practices of licensing boards reveals that in many cases, 
even a board without a majority of licensees can make decisions by a “controlling 
number” of professionals. 
Quorum rules – such as the very common rule that a majority of the board 
constitutes a quorum – can allow a professional minority of the board to form a 
majority at meetings.39 Similarly, voting rules, such as a rule that a non-professional 
member of the board cannot vote, can turn what by membership is a non-dominated 
board into one where the licensees enjoy a majority.40 This may explain why the court 
used the term “controlling number” rather than “majority”: “controlling number” 
captures circumstances where licensees do not formally make up a majority of the 
39  For example, physical therapists have enjoyed a majority at all of the last five meetings of the North 
Dakota Board of Physical Therapy, despite a statutory requirement that half the board’s seats go to 
non-licensees. See Board Minutes, N.D. Bd. of Physical Therapy, https://www.ndbpt.org/minutes.asp 
(last visited July 29, 2016). Despite the attendance issues, the current composition of the board reflects 
the statutorily required membership. See N.D. Cent. Code § 43-26.1-02 (2015); North Dakota Board 
of Physical Therapy Members, N.D. Bd. of Physical Therapy, https://www.ndbpt.org/about_us.asp 
(last visited July 29, 2016).
40  For an example of this, see the Arkansas State Board of Acupuncture, which disables one of its non-
professional members from voting. Ark. Code Ann. § 17-102-201 (West 2016) (“[T]he ex officio 
member shall have no vote, shall not serve as an officer of the board, and shall not be counted to 
establish a quorum or a majority necessary to conduct business.”).
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board, but in practice exercise voting control. It seems likely that the Court will 
define “controlling number” to refer to those actually present and able to vote when 
a decision was made. 
3. The Future of Occupational Licensing
 
The basic structure of occupational licensing in the U.S. – self-regulation with little 
or no governmental involvement – is endangered. States should see the holding of 
North Carolina Dental as both a threat and an opportunity. The threat, of course, 
is that their boards will be sued and individual board members held liable for treble 
damages for anticompetitive occupational regulation. These suits have already 
begun, and will likely continue to be filed in significant numbers. The opportunity 
is the chance to reform the regulatory infrastructure governing almost a third of 
American workers to make it more fair, efficient, and immune to antitrust suit.
3.1. Boards Under Scrutiny
 
North Carolina Dental has precipitated a legal crisis for states and their occupational 
licensing boards. Since the decision was handed down last year, at least thirteen 
suits have been filed against licensing boards. Perhaps unsurprisingly, North 
Carolina has been the hardest hit, with three suits against three different boards.41 
California is facing two suits42 and Connecticut,43 Georgia,44  Louisiana,45 Nevada,46 
Pennsylvania,47 Mississippi,48 Tennessee49 and Texas50 are each facing one suit. These 
thirteen boards are not unique; for every board that has been sued, there are more 
than one hundred others that are potentially vulnerable. The variety of suits reflects 
the spectrum of competitive risks posed by professional self-regulation. Several 
boards are accused of suppressing innovative new forms of professional practice that 
threaten the bottom line of traditional practitioners. Other suits allege unreasonable 
41  See Jemsek v. N.C. Med. Bd., No. 5:16-cv-00059 (E.D.N.C. filed Feb. 2, 2016); Henry v. N.C. 
Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15-cv-00831 (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 7, 2015); LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. 
N.C. State Bar, No. 1:15-cv-00439 (M.D.N.C. filed Jun. 3, 2015).
42  See Kinney v. State Bar of Cal., No. 3:16-cv-02277 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 27, 2016); Gonzalez v. Cal. 
Bureau of Real Estate, No. 2:15-cv-02448 (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 11, 2015).
43  See Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., No. 3:15-cv-00906-CSH (D. Conn. filed Jun. 12, 2015).
44  See Colindres v. Battle, No. 1:15-cv-02843-SCJ (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 12, 2015).
45  See Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, No. 3:15-cv-00615 (M.D. La. filed Sept. 11, 2015).
46  See Strategic Pharm. Solutions, Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharm., No. 2:16-cv-00171-RFB-VCF (D. 
Nev. filed Jan. 29, 2016).
47  See Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, No. 2:15-cv-01334 (W.D. Pa. filed Oct. 14, 2015).
48  See Axcess Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Miss. State Bd. of Med. Licensure, No. 3:15-cv-00307-WHB-JCG (S.D. 
Miss. filed Apr. 24, 2015).
49  See WSPTN Corp. v. Tenn. Dep’t of Health, No. 3:15-cv-00840 (M.D. Tenn. filed Jul. 30, 2015).
50  See Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 1:15-cv-00343-RP (W.D. Tex. filed Apr. 29, 2015).
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and unfair entry barriers, and some concern occupational scope-of-practice, the issue 
in North Carolina Dental. 
A finding of no antitrust immunity in these suits means that the board members 
are legally no different from members of a private cartel, and so are personally 
financially liable for three times the compensatory damages alleged by a plaintiff. 
Besides money damages, most of these suits ask for injunctive relief that would 
reverse the challenged regulatory action. Without state action immunity, any board 




States are likely to make changes to how they regulate the professions in the wake 
of North Carolina Dental. They should embrace this opportunity to improve the 
substance and process of their licensing schemes. States are likely to regard the 
specter of ongoing antitrust scrutiny as untenable because many licensing rules run 
afoul of the Sherman Act and because personal financial liability for board members 
(with treble damages) is very likely to chill board membership. Boar immunity is 
probably the most efficient option for states.
North Carolina Dental provides states with two options for conferring immunity 
on licensing boards: active state supervision or modification of board membership. 
If states minimally comply with the requirements for state action immunity, that 
certainly stands to improve the state of licensing in the U.S.; both options require 
more state involvement and political accountability and discourage self-regulation. 
But states should go further than the floor set by federal antitrust law. The stakes 
of occupational licensing go beyond antitrust law. Inefficient licensing rules cost a 
state’s consumers and can amplify income inequality. Since states must make changes 
in response to North Carolina Dental anyway, they should take the opportunity to 




Even practitioner-dominated boards enjoy immunity from the antitrust laws, as long 
as the state actively supervises their activity. Active supervision would allow states 
to confer immunity on all licensing rules and regulations without making changes 
at the board level. Supervision has some distinct advantages over board reformation, 
including centralization: one umbrella supervisor could theoretically oversee all 
licensing board activity. It also has the advantage of ensuring accountability by 
forcing politically responsive state supervisors to examine, approve, and take 
responsibility for board regulations. And if the states use this opportunity – as I 
argue they should – to reform the substance of licensing regimes, centralized state 
supervisors can facilitate efficient reform.  
The biggest disadvantage of using supervision to immunize boards is that the 
Court has been vague about what constitutes adequate supervision. States may not 
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feel confident that a proposed scheme will pass muster. Another disadvantage is that 
creating a supervisory body would require major legislation, and perhaps even state 
constitutional amendment. Finding the political capital to make that happen could 
be difficult, especially in states where small government is prized and supervisory 
structures would be seen as adding another layer of red tape. A supervisory body 
would also need significant funding, which again could encounter resistance in the 
political process. Despite these issues, at least one state has already passed legislation 
giving its governor’s office a supervisory role.51 
3.2.2. Board Reformation
For states wary of the legal uncertainties surrounding active supervision, the 
another route to immunity may be attractive. States could reform boards to avoid the 
dominance identified in North Carolina Dental by adding non-licensee members. 
These non-dominated boards would not need active supervision to be immune from 
antitrust suit. This solution is relatively cheap, simple, and politically attractive to 
legislatures hoping to avoid the creation of ever more regulatory infrastructure. It also 
presents an opportunity to add some diversity to the conversation about licensing. The 
nonprofessional member seats could be given to stakeholders, especially consumer 
advocates, who may push for a lighter touch in regulating the professions.
Board reformation has some disadvantages as well. It does not avoid all legal 
uncertainty, since the Court was unclear about what “controlling number” and “active 
market participant” could mean. It may be a more cumbersome solution, because 
while supervision could be created by a single act of the legislature, board reformation 
requires changing every board. Further, board reformation may be a less promising 
means than supervision to enact a state’s vision of leaner occupational licensing. 
Reforming boards to avoid a professional majority may help curb the excesses of 
occupational licensing, but how much it will help remains an open question. States 
may want more regulatory reform, and to get it they may have to adopt a top-down 
solution. In the final analysis, it is unclear which route to immunity is the best – 
whether the goal is lighter licensing requirements or certainty of immunity. States 
will undoubtedly have to experiment with various solutions before anyone can 
confidently say which is best.
3.2.3. Policy Changes
Whichever route to immunity a state chooses, the goal should not only be antitrust 
immunity but sparer and more efficient licensing schemes. For some occupations, 
such as bee-keeping, shampooing, fortunetelling, and the like, licensing should 
be eliminated altogether. For others, licensing restrictions should be pared down 
51  See Ga. Code Ann. § 43-1C-3 (West 2016) (giving the governor authority to “review and, in writing, 
approve or veto any rule” proposed by a state professional licensing board before it becomes effective).
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according to a cost-benefit analysis. More data is needed on how specific licensing 
requirements affect quality and price. Here, the decentralization of American 
licensing regulation can help; regulatory variety between states means economists 
can compare approaches and study the effectiveness of various licensing rules. 
Recognizing this opportunity, the U.S. Department of Labor has made $7.5 million 
available to states wishing to study their own licensing regulation and to develop and 
implement improvements.52 Together with the changes mandated by North Carolina 
Dental, this research and advocacy could have real impact, provided the reforms 
are data-driven, and not, as has been the case for decades, the result of lobbying by 
licensees.
4. Conclusion
Labor economists have been arguing for decades that American occupational 
licensing has gone too far, but real reform has been elusive. The vast majority of 
licensing boards are dominated by licensees, and their regulations reflect the self-
dealing one would expect from a cartel, not a governmental body. Now, with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina Dental, the states face a Hobson’s 
choice: either change the way that nearly a third of the workforce is regulated, or 
expose licensing rules to antitrust suit. States should take the mandate for reform 
as an opportunity to introduce efficiency, transparency, and fairness into their 
occupational licensing schemes. 
52  See Notice of Intent to Fund Project on Occupational Licensing Review and Portability: NOI-
ETA-16-14, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Emp’t. & Training Admin., https://www.doleta.gov/grants/pdf/NOI-
ETA-16-14.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).
